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ABSTRACT 
  Through the examination of charitable contributions in the wake of the 2008 
Wenchuan earthquake, this paper strives to comment on donation tendencies among 
individuals in Mainland China. The data analysis portion of this paper employs the use of 
both binary logistic and linear regression models to determine the effects of carefully 
discerned influential variables on an individual’s donation decision and extent of 
donation respectively. Said variables were chosen by a combination of their frequency in 
preexisting research and speculative causal theory. In addition to the importance of 
obvious demographic and economic indicators, findings suggest that political status has a 
pronounced effect on the extent of an individual’s donation amount. Consequently, this 
finding also readily supports prior literature detailing the role of government in the most 
recent and rapid development of Chinese civil society. 
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 1 
Introduction 
 
 On May 12th, 2008, China suffered one of its most severe natural disasters since 
the infamous 1976 Tangshan Earthquake. A near 8.0 magnitude quake struck the 
country’s Southwestern Sichuan Province, originating in the small county (by China 
standards) of Wenchuan. The Great Wenchuan earthquake (wenchuan dadizhen), or 
Sichuan earthquake, as it has come to be known, claimed the lives of tens of thousands of 
people. Since the earthquake struck during the early afternoon hours, many of the 
casualties were children in attendance at school. Within the months immediately 
following the natural disaster, reports from investigative news outlets sought to explain 
this monumental loss of life among young students. In particular, the Chinese magazine 
Caijing uncovered evidence implicating local cadres for mismanagement of public funds 
that led to the shoddy construction of schools in the 1990s.1  For a number of school 
buildings, bamboo had been substituted in place of steel from the original designs – the 
schools (and the children within them) never stood a chance.2 The Chinese Communist 
Party (CCP) was unwilling to openly admit responsibility for the gross negligence 
committed, and even took efforts to silence the discussion of it in the media. Famous yet 
controversial artist Ai Weiwei was met with much resistance from the Ministry of Civil 
Affairs when he launched a citizens’ investigation to discover and document the names of 
all the children lost in the earthquake.3 Like much else in China, the CCP wanted to 
control the narrative.  
																																																								
1 Evan Osnos, Age of Ambition: Chasing Fortune, Truth, and Faith in the New China (New York: Farrar, 
Straus and Giroux, 2014), 129-130. 
2 Ibid. 
3 Ibid, 183-185. 
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 This outbreak of civil consciousness in response to the Wenchuan earthquake 
went well beyond risky news stories and the actions of well-known figures. The national 
tragedy spurred a charitable renaissance of sorts, where individual donation levels soared 
for the first time in modern Chinese history. Supposedly having had its ‘heartstrings 
tugged,’ the CCP was at the very front of this movement both accepting donations and 
encouraging Party members to donate on their own. The result was staggering, so much 
so that 2009 (the year directly following the quake) has since come to be known as the 
country’s “year of philanthropy.”4 Because of this outpouring of philanthropic 
contributions, the Sichuan earthquake is widely regarded as the single event that has 
forever altered the landscape of charitable giving in contemporary China.5 The donation 
behavior witnessed in the aftermath of the earthquake stands in stark contrast to trends 
from the previous Maoist and post-Mao eras. In comparison, China then and now bears 
almost no resemblance. When China reopened its doors to the world in 1978, the country 
as a whole was extraordinarily poor. Only a select few could have possibly envisioned 
the path their nation was about to embark upon, but even fewer would have willingly bet 
on its degree of success. Impoverished, internally divided and still reeling from the deaths 
of beloved revolutionary stalwarts Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai (1976), the average 
Chinese person was in no position to worry about philanthropy and matters of civil 
society.  
 Fast forward to present day, wealth in China is seemingly ubiquitous. Forbes 
Magazine now annually publishes a “China Rich List” (Zhongguo fuhao bang), and the 																																																								
4 Leslie Lenkowsky, “As Charities Grow in China, They Challenge Government’s Dominance,” Chronicle 
of Philanthropy 22, no. 8 (2010): 24.	
5 Yuan Zheng, “Charitable Contribution in China’s Single-Child Generation: How and Why Do They 
Give” (master’s thesis, University of Pittsburgh, 2011), 31. <http://d-
scholarship.pitt.edu.umiss.idm.oclc.org/8695/1/YuanZhengMasterThesis.pdf> 
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latest one from 2016 identified an increase of 35 new billionaires (and or billionaire 
families) in the previous year alone with an estimated 400 total.6 The country’s growing 
number of billionaires coupled with its rising middle class means that the Chinese 
population is more than capable of achieving global relevance in regard to charitable 
behavior. The Wenchuan earthquake is direct proof of this possibility.  
 Though much has changed, one constant has been the Chinese Communist Party. 
The CCP has been instrumental in the growth and development of civil society in Modern 
China, often opting for a “hands-on” approach in the monitoring of it. However, China’s 
version of civil society is distinctly complex in the sense that its actors don’t conform to 
the traditional roles prescribed by European philosophers. There is no clear separation 
between the ‘state’ and ‘civil society’ that is a hallmark of Hegelian thinkers, and civil 
society most definitely is not a “source of political change” that supporters of Marx and 
Engels allude to.7 Hegel’s idea that the state is simultaneously linked to different societal 
groups and individual members in one shared “individual national community” cannot be 
applied to China.8 In the Leninist tradition, the Party is the vanguard of the people, and 
the people don’t have a say in determining a shared conception of the common good. To 
a certain extent, Chinese people still define themselves individually in terms of the their 
role in the greater group or collective. They generally avoid using the term citizen 
(gongmin) and disregard the notion of inherent rights (renquan) that is often associated 
with citizenship. Consequently, the individual’s influence on civil society is negligible, 
which has allowed the CCP to fashion its role and purpose in society. Not unlike the 																																																								
6 Russell Flannery, “Inside The 2016 Forbes List of China’s 400 Richest People: Wang Jianlin Repeats At 
No. 1,” Forbes Asia, November 2016. 
7 Z.A. Pelczynski, The State and Civil Society: Studies in Hegel’s Political Philosophy (Cambridge; New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 1-2. 
8 Ibid, 265-267.	
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country’s state-led market economy, China’s civil society must ultimately answer to the 
government.  
 The background story of the Wenchuan earthquake grants unique insight into the 
interplay of the state and civil actors in China. May 12th, 2008 irrevocably changed the 
dynamic of Chinese philanthropy and civil society, which makes it an ideal jumping-off 
point for research on individual donation behavior. A better understanding of said 
donation behavior witnessed in the wake of the Wenchuan earthquake could help predict 
future individual donation trends, as well as comment on the nature of civil society in 
China. Thus, understanding characteristics of those who did (and did not) contribute, as 
well as the extent to which those characteristics may have influenced contribution 
amounts becomes necessary knowledge. Through the completion of this paper, it 
becomes clear that the CCP’s control over Chinese civil society is quasi~ paternalistic in 
the sense that the state is continuing its monopoly over charitable behavior, but doing so 
in a way that seemingly grants autonomy to the actors involved. 
 
Outline 
 
 Section one is composed of the introduction, as well as a review of pertinent 
literature in chapter 1. Section two consists of chapters 2-5 and primarily focuses on 
theories behind the four most intriguing causal mechanisms—political status/civil 
society, economic status, age/healthcare spending, and gender respectively. Essentially, 
each chapter in this section is a different factor that could significantly impact an 
individual’s willingness to donate and/or extent of donation. The causal stories for the 
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remaining variables are explored in the literature review portion of this paper. A full list 
of hypotheses is included at the end of this section. Section 3 examines the data model (in 
its entirety) in chapter 6 and concludes with final remarks in chapter 7. 
 6 
Chapter 1—Literature Review 
 
 The word “philanthropy” can assume any number of slightly different meanings. 
In both of his influential works on the subject, Robert Payton prescribes to a simple yet 
widely encompassing definition of ‘philanthropy’ as “voluntary action for the public 
good.”9 Adapting Payton’s definition and contextualizing it in terms of charitable 
contributions, Mike Martin defines ‘philanthropy’ more specifically as “voluntary private 
giving for public purpose.”10 With regard to examining a predominantly non-religious 
and morally ambiguous present-day Chinese society, I find Martin’s “value-neutral” yet 
all-encompassing definition of philanthropy to be particularly fitting.11 However, 
understanding philanthropy and its role in Chinese society goes well beyond a simple 
definition. More specifically, many individuals speculate that China’s historical 
development under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) post-1949 
revolution has been one of the major obstacles to the nation’s attempts to cultivate a civil 
society today. In the 2015 edition of Asian Studies Review 39 no. 4, Elaine Jeffreys’s 
paper “Celebrity Philanthropy in Mainland China” briefly examines the significance of 
philanthropy and charity in the Mao and post-Mao era. Jeffreys notes that “philanthropy” 
and “charity” (as we understand them today) were nonexistent in China up until the 
																																																								
9 Robert L. Payton, Philanthropy: Voluntary Action for the Public Good (New York: American Council on 
Education/Macmillan Pub. Co, 1988).  
10 Mike W. Martin, Virtuous Giving: Philanthropy, Voluntary Service, and Caring (Bloomington, Ind: 
Indiana University Press, 1994), IX. 
11 Ibid. 
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government began market reforms in the late 1970s.12 Although philanthropy didn’t exist 
in terms of private donations, similar types of state-provided welfare existed “rather as 
services (fuwu) relating to care (guanhuai zhaogu), welfare (fuli), relief (jiuji) and 
allowances (buzhu).”13 Through the utilization of the “state enterprise” and labor 
relations in particular, the Chinese government under Mao Zedong effectively made “the 
shift from asceticism to paternalism.”14 Andrew G. Walder further explicates that a key 
trope of this new “paternalistic approach to labor relations” was “the provision of 
collective services and benefits.”15 These collective services and benefits ran the gamut 
from health insurance/medical care to pensions and childcare to education; the state was 
the largest provider of basic consumer goods.16 In other words, the government’s 
paternalistic attitude hindered the natural need-based development of a charitable 
consciousness, especially when considering the Marxist narrative that viewed organized 
charity “as the means by which elite groups attempted to prevent class struggle by 
placating the proletariat.”17 In an ironic yet most likely intentional twist of fate, the CCP 
became an elite group that relied on this paternalistic behavior to maintain political 
legitimacy of sorts.  
 
 
 
 																																																								
12 Elaine Jeffreys, “Celebrity Philanthropy in Mainland China,” Asian Studies Review 39, no. 4 (2015): 573. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Andrew G. Walder, Communist Neo-Traditionalism: Work and Authority in Chinese Industry (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1988), 227. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Ibid, 16. 
17 Elaine Jeffreys, “Celebrity Philanthropy in Mainland China,” 573. 
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Political and Economic Status 
 
 After China adopted its “reform and open up” (gaige kaifang) policy in 1978, the 
nation’s lack of a civil society started to become increasingly more obvious as market 
conditions took hold. Even then, modern conceptions of philanthropy only really began to 
set in from the mid-1990s onward.18 Coincidentally, for around the same period of time, 
Dali Ma and William L. Parish discovered a unique linkage of private business and the 
government in China necessitated by a desire from entrepreneurs to improve social status 
that met with the government’s desperate need to adequately fund public works and 
welfare projects.19 As a result, Ma and Parish argue that “Chinese private entrepreneurs 
gave considerable charitable contributions because these contributions elicited social and 
political benefits in return” (as measured by appointments to local political councils), 
which resembles the previous private business and government linkages via ‘charity’ in 
the late 18th century France as classified by Tocqueville.20  
 A few years later in 2001, CCP leader Jiang Zemin formally lifted the ban in 
place since August 1989 that prevented these same private entrepreneurs from officially 
entering the ranks of the party.21 In this expansion of party membership, Jiang Zemin 
married the public societal elite (previous CCP members) with the private societal elite 
(entrepreneurs). Consequently, he solidified the eventual base group of those most likely 
to take an active role in the development of China’s civil society through philanthropic 																																																								
18 Ibid, 574. 
19 Dali Ma and William L. Parish. "Tocquevillian Moments: Charitable Contributions by Chinese Private 
Entrepreneurs." Social Forces 85, no. 2 (2006): 948, accessed November 13, 2016, 
<https://muse.jhu.edu/>. 
20 Ibid, 944. 
21 Bruce J. Dickson, Red Capitalists in China: The Party, Private Entrepreneurs, and Prospects for 
Political Change (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 1. 
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tendencies. This later becomes increasingly more obvious, specifically with party and 
local government support of quasi-NGO led charitable initiatives. For example, in their 
book Paying for Progress in China: Public Finance, Human Welfare and Changing 
Patterns of Inequality, Vivienne Shue and Christine Wong make reference to one of 
China’s education focused quasi-NGO charities called “Project Hope” (Xiwang 
Gongcheng).22 Shue and Wong found that it was not uncommon for localities to mandate 
cadre donations to a Project Hope local branch, and even discovered that “finding 
external benefactors became an important part of their officially assessed contribution to 
local development.”23 Even dating back to as early as 2005, the central government 
through its Ministry of Civil Affairs has annually been recognizing individuals for 
exemplary philanthropic behavior (Zhonghua Cishan Jiang), “with private entrepreneurs 
and leaders of state-owned enterprises receiving awards for the recorded extent of their 
donations.”24  
 It then makes sense that party members and other elites should be among the most 
willing to contribute and most generous in their contributions in the realm of Chinese 
civil society today. Not only do they have legitimate motivations and benefits from their 
own charitable contributions, but as Bruce J. Dickson puts it in his book Red Capitalists 
in China: The Party, Private Entrepreneurs, and Prospects for Political Change, “the 
more you have, the more you can give.”25 Dickson’s regression model examined 
“Determinants of Community Contributions by Entrepreneurs” and his multivariate 
analysis unsurprisingly found a strong positive correlation between ‘years in business, 																																																								
22 Vivienne Shue and Christine Wong, Paying for Progress in China: Public Finance, Human Welfare and 
Changing Patterns of Inequality (London: Routledge, 2007), 87-88. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Elaine Jeffreys, “Celebrity Philanthropy in Mainland China,” 575. 
25 Bruce J. Dickson, Red Capitalists in China, 119.  
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family income, and enterprise revenue’ with ‘level of donations.’26 However, on a more 
interesting note, Dickson’s model found that “level of development (of an area/place) is 
negatively correlated with charitable giving.”26 In other words, affluent areas were 
associated with less charitable giving from entrepreneurs. The wealthiest areas by far in 
China are Tier 1 Cities. 
 
Tier 1 Cities 
 
 In recent years, cities across China have been stratified into five different ‘tiers’ 
based on their level of development with ‘Tier 1’cities being the most developed. It goes 
without saying, the wealthiest strata of Chinese society predominantly live in Tier 1 
cities. Although one would expect higher levels of contributions from more developed 
areas like Tier 1 cities, Dickson speculates that the explanation behind his opposite 
finding may have something to do with local community need being higher in less 
developed areas.27 To some extent, this may reflect an interesting attitude towards 
donations where the motivation for Chinese to donate mostly stems from the belief that 
there is a true need in a certain place. That being said, disaster relief donations are usually 
made because the need of the disaster-stricken area is pretty apparent, but it would not be 
wrong to assume level of donations may be higher to places closer to the impact zone 
with greater need. Understanding the severity of the damage caused by the Wenchuan 
earthquake in 2008, the Chinese central government implemented its “Post-Wenchuan 
Earthquake Recovery and Reconstruction Counterpart Aid Program” (Wenchuandizhen 																																																								
26 Ibid. 
27 Ibid, 120. 
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Zaihou Huifuchongjian Duikouzhiyuan Fang’an) with the slogan “one province helps one 
severe disaster affected area, using the entire country’s strength, to accelerate recovery 
and reconstruction” (yishengbangyixian, juquanguozhili, jiakuaihuifuchongjian).28 As its 
name indicates, the program paired twenty or so different provinces (or Tier 1 cities) with 
various disaster-stricken counties in Sichuan province to increase charitable relief 
donations with the hopes of speeding up the recovery and reconstruction process. 
Because of this government initiative, one would logically assume that donations would 
be higher for individuals residing in Tier 1 cities.  
 
Gender 
 
 With regard to gender and philanthropic behavior, the research is anything but 
conclusive. In their paper “Gender Differences in Charitable Giving,” (Mesch, Brown, 
Moore and Hayat) examined the universally accepted claim that “female-headed 
households are more likely to give and give more to charity than male-headed households 
across all charitable subsectors and income levels,” which was put forth in a recent study 
done by Debra J. Mesch at Indiana University’s Women’s Philanthropy Institute.29 
Through analyzing two national datasets and creating their own empathetic concern 
index, (Mesch, Brown, Moore and Hayat) found that women quite significantly outscored 
men in terms of ‘empathetic concern’ and ‘principle of care,’ and when controlling for 
these two motives (as well as other additional influencing factors) their results confirmed 																																																								
28 Miaofeng Xie and Yanyan Liu, “Yifangyounan Bafangzhiyuan,” Nanfang Ribao A16ban: “Wenchuan 
Da Dizhen San Zhounian Chong Zheng Heshan,” last modified May 12, 2011, 
<http://epaper.southcn.com/nfdaily/html/2011-05/12/content_6959134.html>. 
29 Debra J. Mesch, Women Give 2010, Center on Philanthropy: Indianapolis, IN, 2010, accessed November 
27, 2016. <http://www.philanthropy.iupui.edu/womengive/docs/womengive2010report.pdf>. 
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that women “are more likely to give and give more” in comparison to men.30 Interesting 
enough though, the November 2016 Charities Aid Foundation’s (CAF) report found 
identical donation behavior for both men and women just a calendar year after men 
surpassed women in terms of money donated globally.31 The CAF also found that women 
only tended to donate more in advanced developed economies, while men usually 
donated slightly more in transitioning economies (developing countries).31 This poses an 
interesting quandary for China, which does not quite fit either description. Parts of China 
are significantly more developed than others, and it would depend almost entirely upon 
individuals surveyed in the data to make a somewhat accurate prediction. Women have 
certainly experienced a general rise in their socioeconomic status, but they still have a 
long way to ago. For more on gender, please refer to chapter 5. 
 
Age 
 
 Another traditional determinant of philanthropic behavior is age, and the research 
is rather straightforward. Since the inception of the CAF’s World Giving Index in 2010, 
likelihood of donation has always increased in tandem with age, and that holds true in 
their latest report released in 2016.31 Specifically, 30-49 year olds in the mid age group 
have seen a constant increase in donation level while the age group of 15-29 year olds has 
seen their level of donation drop after five previous years of gradual growth.31 However, 
as Pamala Wiepking and Russell James III found in their 2012 research article Why Are 																																																								
30 Debra J. Mesch, Melissa S. Brown, Zachary I. Moore, and Amir Daniel Hayat, “Gender Differences in 
Charitable Giving,” International Journal of Nonprofit & Voluntary Sector Marketing 16, no. 4 (2011): 
351, accessed November 27, 2016. <Business Source Complete, EBSCOhost>. 
31 Charities Aid Foundation. CAF World Giving Index 2016. Charities Aid Foundation (CAF): 20-21, 2016. 
<http://admin.issuelab.org/permalink/resource/25787>. 
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the Oldest Old Less Generous? Explanations for the Unexpected Age-Related Drop in 
Charitable Giving, the oldest individuals in the elderly age group tend to donate less in 
large part due to a simultaneous worsening in health conditions met with more expensive 
and burdensome healthcare costs.32 Much of China’s newly minted wealth is in the hands 
of what would be considered the younger and mid age groups, but ruling out accumulated 
wealth among the elderly would be naïve. The nature of China’s social safety net and 
health care system may have some influence over the relationship between age and 
donation. For a more in-depth look at this relationship, please refer to chapter 4. 
 
General Statement of Hypotheses 
 
Political Status 
 All else being equal, CCP affiliation will have a positive relationship with both 
willingness to donate and extent of donation.  
 All else being equal, a position in a government department will have a positive 
relationship with both willingness to donate and extent of donation. 
Economic Status 
 All else being equal, level of household income will have a positive relationship 
with extent of donation, but not necessarily willingness to donate. 
Age and Health Care Spending 
 
																																																								
32 P. (Pamala) Wiepking and R.N. (Russell) James III, “Why Are the Oldest Old Less Generous? 
Explanations for the Unexpected Age-Related Drop in Charitable Giving,” Ageing and Society Vol. 2012: 
503-504. 2012. <http://repub.eur.nl/pub/38236> 	
 14 
 All else being equal, age will have an initial positive relationship with both 
willingness to donate and extent of donation, then eventually reverse.  
 All else being equal, amount of health care spending will have a positive 
relationship with both willingness to donate and extent of donation. 
Gender 
 All else being equal, being a female head of household will have a positive 
relationship with both willingness to donate and extent of donation. 
Gender Interaction 
 All else being equal, being a female head of household and living in a rural area 
will have a negative relationship with both willingness to donate and extent of donation. 
 All else being equal, the interaction of being a female head of household and 
affiliated with the CCP will have a positive relationship with both willingness to donate 
and extent of donation. 
 All else being equal, the interaction of being a female head of household and 
having a higher level of household income will have a positive relationship with both 
willingness to donate and extent of donation. 
 All else being equal, the interaction of being a female head of household and 
having a higher level of education will have a positive relationship with both willingness 
to donate and extent of donation. 
Education 
 All else being equal, level of education will have a positive relationship with both 
willingness to donate and extent of donation. 
Tier 1 City 
 15 
 All else being equal, living in a Tier 1 city will have a positive relationship with 
both willingness to donate and extent of donation. 
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Chapter 2—Civil Society and Political Status 
 
 Throughout much of the developed Western world, the autonomous function of 
‘civil society’ from the state is not only to be expected, but also encouraged. However, a 
deeper understanding of civil society beyond its typical separation from the state is 
necessary to understand philanthropic behavior in China. In analyzing the current 
Chinese civil society, B. Michael Frolic refers to four perspectives on civil society that 
have emerged since the fall of communism in the early 1990s: “civil society as a parallel 
polis,” “civil society as citizenship,” “civil society as political development,” and “civil 
society as governance.”33 The concept of “civil society as a parallel polis” is associated 
with the creation of opposition structures outside of the state by active dissidents and 
intellectuals standing against weakened totalitarian regimes that have wronged the 
people.34 “Civil society as citizenship” involves a virtuous and elitist community of 
citizens that operates in conjunction with the state on behalf of the common good, while 
“civil society as political development” is the Western-based model that provides 
individuals the space to politically define themselves and the freedom to pursue private 
interests.35 “Civil society as governance” operates on the assumption that civil society is 
the principal “lubricator” that both facilitates and links all the different parts
																																																								
33 B. Michael Frolic, “State-Led Civil Society,” in Civil Society in China, ed. Timothy Brook and B. 
Michael Frolic (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1997), 46-67. 
34 Ibid, 49-50. 
35 Ibid, 51-54. 
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operating simultaneously yet independently in the political sphere.36 In other words, civil 
society is much more complicated than the hackneyed oversimplified understanding of it 
as simply “against the state.”  
 Although arguments can be made relating certain characteristics of China’s 
emerging civil society to the four aforementioned models, none of them quite accurately 
depict the interplay between the Chinese government and the groups operating within the 
very narrow space afforded to them by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Similar in 
function to the nation’s state-led market (or capitalist) economy, the China model is 
better understood from the perspective of a “state-led civil society.” Essentially, China 
has cultivated its civil society through the creation and development of numerous 
organizations that “serve as the support mechanisms to the state.”37 Fearing the 
democratizing forces that have traditionally accompanied the growth of civil societies in 
former authoritarian and totalitarian states, the CCP adeptly chose to facilitate an 
interdependent “marriage of convenience rather than a catalyst for citizens resistance.”38   
 This “marriage of convenience” that Frolic speaks of bears striking resemblance 
to the “Tocquevillian moments” documented by both Ma and Parish where private 
business and the government linked up in the 1990s.39 Later party membership expansion 
to include capitalists (private entrepreneurs) in the early 2000s shows the CCP’s desire to 
rein in and control potentially influential forces (i.e. the societal elite). A move that was 
both politically convenient, and economically useful. This play to control influential 
forces becomes even more apparent when examining the CCP’s post-1978 recruitment 
																																																								
36 Ibid.	
37 Ibid, 56-58. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Dali Ma and William L. Parish. "Tocquevillian Moments,” 948.	
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strategies, which aimed to form a consolidated technocratic elite through the targeting of 
highly educated urban professionals.40 The changing focus of the Communist Party was 
by no means a coincidence, but rather Chinese officials recognized the role that 
intellectuals (zhishifenzi) and the economic elite play in traditional Western civil society 
and the development of democracy. As Randy Kluver argues, Chinese leaders have no 
problem with elites acting on behalf of “the people’s interest” and claiming 
representation, but only if it benefits the state.41 Consequently, Kluver asserts that the 
difference between the nation’s emerging civil society and Western liberal tradition has 
to do with China’s tendency towards “elite-based civic discourse” due to the association 
of status and its ensuing responsibility of representation, as opposed to individuals simply 
voicing out on their own behalf.42 Quite simply, the Chinese elite has relative discretion 
in dictating the scope and direction of the country’s civil society. However, it is important 
to note that the societal elite generally support the Party, or happen to be Party members 
themselves.  
 The government undoubtedly has a vested interest in an effective civil society, 
especially given China’s inadequate and seriously overburdened social safety net. A well-
functioning civil society can decrease the government’s welfare burden. Providing for the 
general welfare of the Chinese population (just below 1.4 billion people) presents the 
Communist Party with a problem that has only been exacerbated by the onset of 
capitalistic market conditions and the nation’s embrace of global markets. Although 
																																																								
40 Yanjie Bian, Xiaoling Shu, and John R. Logan, “Communist Party Membership and Regime Dynamics 
in China,” Social Forces 79 (3) (2001): 805. 
41 Randy Kluver, “Elite-Based Discourse in Chinese Civil Society,” in Civic Discourse, Civil Society, and 
Chinese Communities, ed. Randy Kluver and John H. Powers (Stamford, Conn: Ablex Pub. Corp, 1999), 
20.  
42 Ibid. 
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many Chinese have seen a noticeable rise in their standard of living since the country re-
opened its doors in 1978, globalization has produced a growing number of “losers” in 
China as foreshadowed by former Chairman Deng Xiaoping’s famous quote, “let some 
people get rich first” (rang yibufen ren xian fuqilai). For a CCP that has staked a large 
portion of its legitimacy on the promise of continual economic growth, an inability to 
perform basic social welfare duties is a potentially destabilizing force and a potent 
rallying point of discontent. Amidst further concerns of inequality, the Party internally 
finds itself in a rather precarious position. Understanding the risks associated with this 
possibility, Chinese government officials have taken an active role in the cultivation of 
the country’s civil society in the hopes of partially alleviating the ever-increasing social 
welfare burden on the state. Ironically, the argument can be made that the Party is acting 
on behalf of its concern for legitimacy while at the same time giving birth to a 
conceivable mouthpiece for future criticism if left unchecked.   
  The CCP’s role in the support and development of Chinese civil society is 
difficult to comprehend without a requisite knowledge and understanding of the Party’s 
proclivity towards the use of its traditional weapon, the “model” (biaoshuai). The 
practice of emulating models not only has an established philosophical Chinese 
background, but also is inherent to the traditional Chinese understanding of Marxist 
doctrine that prioritizes the teaching of material through the application or practice of it.43 
Particularly revealing is the fact that the Chinese language has two famous idioms 
(chengyu) often utilized to espouse this principle: “teaching by word of mouth is inferior 
to teaching by example” (yanjiao buru shenjiao) and “teaching by example is better than 																																																								
43 Donald J. Munro, The Concept of Man in Contemporary China (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan 
Press, 2000), 135. 
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teaching by word of mouth” (shenjiao shengyu yanjiao). As Donald J. Munro explicates, 
“Chinese believe that people of all ages learn by imitation,” which elucidates the deeply 
ingrained meaning and purpose of models in Chinese society.44 Furthermore, 
Confucianism teaches that man should strive to attain model status since respect and 
honor hails from being worthy of imitation.45 Functionally speaking, models are 
propagandized for the purpose of inculcating virtues, values, and or attitudes deemed 
desirable by leaders for the greater public to learn.46 The era of Chairman Mao saw the 
ideal Communist Lei Feng worthy of emulation through his model of “serving the 
people” (weirenminfuwu), while the reform era under Deng Xiaoping adopted Zhang 
Haidi as the preferred societal model of choice due to her “pursuit of knowledge, help to 
people, and unique individuality.”47  
 The Chinese Communist Party’s use of societal models is well documented, and 
usually reflects the grander goals of the Party at a given period of time. Although the 
CCP’s propagandizing of models is not nearly as overt as it was during the Maoist and 
Deng’s reform eras, it would be naïve to overlook the connection between modern-day 
CCP models and the policy goals they serve to support. For example, shortly after the 
Wenchuan earthquake occurred, reports surfaced that the widow of former Chairman 
Deng Xiaoping was so worried about the earthquake victims that she donated her entire 
life savings, and encouraged family members to make contributions as well.48 A local 
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48 Xiaoyi Wang, “Juan Chu Pingsheng Jixu 10 Wan Yuan Jiuzhu Wenchuan Dizhen Zaiqu,” 
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newspaper from the city of Jiujiang in the Jiangxi Province even published the names of 
local cadres and other Party officials who paid “special Party fees” (teshu dangfei) that 
were used towards earthquake relief efforts at the disaster site in Wenchuan.49 On a more 
general level, the Chinese central government has also been recognizing private 
entrepreneurs and head officials of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) for their on-record 
charitable contributions since as early as 2005.50 The CCP’s message is crystal clear: the 
‘model’ Party member helps “serve the people” by donating generously to charity. In 
terms of national policy objectives, Elaine Jeffreys asserts that the Chinese government 
views aiding in the maturation of “professionalized philanthropy” (a byproduct of a 
strong civil society) as a legitimate solution to help augment the state’s provision of 
social and welfare services.51 The government’s dedication to this national policy 
objective is even evident in the PRC’s latest “Charity Law” (cishan fa) passed in 2016, 
which now officially declared the 5th day of September every year as “China Charity 
Day” (Zhonghua cishan ri).52 
 Despite all these moves to “bolster” Chinese civil society, the government has 
also passed a new law that deliberately complicates operations for foreign non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) (feizhengfu zuzhi). Previously, foreign NGOs found 
themselves forced to operate under the auspices of the Ministry of Civil Affairs, but 
China’s new foreign NGO law passed in 2016 now tasks the Ministry of Public Safety 
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 22 
with the registration and management of foreign NGOs.53 The requirement for foreign 
NGOs to be sponsored by existing government organizations referred to (in the script of 
the law itself) as “professional supervisory units” (yewu zhuguan danwei) still remains 
intact.54 These “professional supervisory units” have come to be known as “mothers-in-
law,” which grants insight into their “popularity” among those in the foreign NGO 
community.55 Ideally, China’s government should want its own burgeoning number of 
domestic-born NGOs to learn from their efficient and well-established foreign 
counterparts, but that is hardly the case. The CCP continues its record of rejecting 
Western influence in the country’s social and civil sphere by intentionally making it 
difficult to abide by China’s latest foreign NGO law. This is yet another example of the 
Party’s desire to foster Chinese civil society into a subservient state support apparatus as 
opposed to an independent and potentially rebellious force.  
 As a result, an individual’s political status should be a key component in 
analyzing charitable behavior like donation tendencies in Mainland China. More 
specifically, political affiliation with the Chinese Communist Party should reflect both an 
increased willingness to donate and a larger extent of donation relative to other 
characteristics. Given the CCP’s use of model Party members and its desire to 
supplement the state’s social welfare provision in the name of safeguarding political 
legitimacy, it is logical to assume that CCP members and individuals working for the 
government would act in the best interest of the Party when it comes to their donation 
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tendencies. The hands-on role of government officials in China’s state-led civil society 
should be apparent in the results of this study. If political status is as important as recent 
history indicates, then one would logically expect Party membership (and/or government 
job status) to be an accurate predictor for both donation decision and amount.
 24 
Chapter 3—Economic Status 
 
 Generally speaking, political and economic status are often intimately related in 
China. As of late, there has been a pervasive belief that admission to the ranks of the 
Party will open doors previously considered to be locked for those without the proper 
political connections. Despite ramped up college recruitment efforts by the CCP in the 
last forty years, surveys indicate that college students generally prioritize their individual 
career aspirations over commitment to the Party’s orthodox ideology.56 Low salaries of 
civil servants (Party affiliated more often than not) have traditionally been boosted by 
lavish meals, fancy gifts, and various other benefits that are now viewed (and punished) 
by the current administration as graft and corruption.57 Regardless, an individual’s 
political status (CCP affiliation and/or government job) in the past has more often than 
not resulted in tangible economic benefits, which means that it is safe to conclude that a 
significant portion of the economic societal elite have strong political connections. In that 
case, donation tendencies of the wealthy should be very similar to those with political 
status.  
 Wealthier individuals obviously tend to donate more all throughout the world 
because they have the means to do so. As Bruce J. Dickson writes, “the more you 
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have, the more you can give.”58 This insight has not always applied to China though. 
While traveling throughout Southwest China interviewing wealthy entrepreneurs, John 
Osburg frequently heard the phrase “Chinese people have no beliefs” (Zhongguoren 
meiyou xinyang) offered up as an explanation behind China’s previous dearth of 
philanthropy.59 Osburg also discovered that many affluent Chengdu entrepreneurs in 
particular were cautious when it came to “publicly visible forms of expenditure:” 
 Organized forms of charity and philanthropy were viewed as particularly 
 problematic because they not only attracted the attention of various state agencies 
 but were also believed to attract even more seekers of handouts and favors.60 
 
To a certain extent, this concern reveals a fatal flaw in the CCP’s “plan” to encourage the 
development of professionalized philanthropy. Party leaders in the Chinese government 
want to unleash the philanthropic capabilities of their country’s wealthy elite, but the fact 
that the government holds a near monopoly on charity creates what seems to be a lack of 
trust in the government by those societal elites.  
 Eight full years after the Wenchuan earthquake, this trust issue has only worsened 
as estimates reveal that “80% of earthquake donations probably transferred through 
government financial accounts.”61 Some individuals chose to donate directly to the 
Chinese central government or the Sichuan provincial government, while others chose to 
donate to foundations like the Red Cross Society of China (Zhongguo hongshizi hui), 
which is in fact not independent of the Chinese government. Despite firm promises from 
officials at the Ministry of Civil Affairs to release donation information on a public 
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platform, they have yet to follow through.62 Across totaled estimates from all donation 
platforms (government – central and provincial, Red Cross, Taobao/Tencent, the One 
Foundation, China Charity, etc…), only “15.1 billion (~23%) RMB (renminbi) of the 
known 65.2 billion RMB donations have been publically disclosed”, while the other 77% 
has still yet to be indentified.63 Clearly, and as always, transparency and corruption are 
legitimate obstacles that stand in the way of wealthy Chinese donors.  
 In addition to transparency and corruption concerns, the nature of China’s tax 
system only serves to complicate matters for those wishing to make charitable 
contributions. Donor incentives like tax deductibles usually play a decisive role in the 
growth and development of civil society’s key players, namely charitable foundations and 
other non-profit organizations (NPOs). In China though, the lack of “a comprehensive 
and integrated tax law specific to NPOs or foundations with clearly defined terms and 
implementation procedures” results in widespread ignorance and confusion with regard to 
potential tax benefits.64 For instance, as part of his master’s degree thesis at the 
University of Pittsburgh, Yuan Zheng conducted interviews in the Southwestern Chinese 
city of Chongqing to gain a greater understanding behind the motivation to donate for 
many individuals and discovered that: 
 Of the 20 people interviewed, only 3 (15%) know about there was a tax deduction 
 policy for charitable donations. However, none of them have ever tried to apply 
 for this preferential policy to reduce their individual income tax. When asked 
 about the reason, “no knowledge on the deduction process”, “the deduction 
 procedures being too complicated and consuming” and “no desire to deal with 
 government agencies” are the major obstacles that have stopped donors to apply 
 for this policy.65 																																																								
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China’s tax law may be comparable to other countries around the world, but in truth it 
does not provide incentives facilitating philanthropic contributions. In terms of the 
process for collecting a deduction, many of the reasons cited by respondents to avoid 
applying are legitimate: 
 In China, there is no social security number that is tied to each individual, and the 
 tax is deducted automatically by his/her employer before paying one’s salary. 
 Individuals do not complete any form to report taxable income or deductible 
 income from donations. Therefore, when a person makes a donation, he has to get
 through a very tedious procedure to claim the deduction. When one does apply, it 
 takes several months and a dozen administrative stamps to get the work done.66 
 
There are certainly a number of key barriers that could potentially discourage donations 
from those with the means to do so, but whether or not these barriers will influence 
donations in the data portion of this paper is difficult to say. China’s set of relatively 
immature tax deduction policies for individual donors provides a legitimate policy 
explanation for those researching the disparity between donations from China’s economic 
elite and the rest of the world’s.  
 Since this study focuses on donations in the wake of the Wenchuan earthquake, 
where charitable contributions most likely occurred in China’s “year of philanthropy” 
(2009), income levels should have a more pronounced effect on individual donation 
amount.67 If the explosion of philanthropic behavior exhibited in 2009 holds true in the 
sense that a large portion of the population chose to contribute, one would expect 
individuals with higher income levels (or an individuals’ higher household income in this 
case) to have contributed more. Through our knowledge of the political connections 
among the Chinese economic elite in conjunction with the role the government played in 																																																								
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the collection and dissemination of disaster relief funds/donations, it is logical to assume 
that Party members and other economic elite may have borne a greater sense of social 
responsibility in the aftermath of the Wenchuan earthquake. This sense of social 
responsibility likely would have resulted in increased levels of donation. 
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Chapter 4—Age and Health Care Spending 
 
 The ageing of China’s population is a serious concern for the Chinese government 
that is literally becoming increasingly pronounced. Close to 15% of the current Chinese 
population is 60 years of age or older, which equates to almost 200 million people.68 For 
a point of reference, the entire U.S. population is north of 320 million. The nation’s 
former “one-child policy” has incontrovertibly acted as an effective accelerant of this 
societal phenomenon, as well as triggered a shift in the population’s gender 
demographics as couples in large numbers chose to abort female babies in alignment with 
their socio-cultural preference for male children. Speaking with any Chinese young adult 
of single-child status about marriage will reveal the inevitable socioeconomic pressure 
lingering over their heads when contemplating the prospects of solely caring for two sets 
of parents into elderly age. 
 The effects of age and health care spending on philanthropic tendencies are to a 
certain extent interrelated, and can be evaluated from an economic or financial 
perspective. On one hand, as an individual grows older and accumulates wages from all 
the years in the workforce, he/she should have more ability to donate compared to a 
younger individual. This line of thinking concurs with findings referred to earlier from 
the CAF World Giving Index 2016, where the odds of donation																																																								
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have increased almost in concert with an individual’s age over the past five years.69 On 
the other hand, elderly age usually means the accumulation of more frequent and 
expensive health care bills that decrease an individual’s means to donate. Prior research 
on donation tendencies of the elderly confirms this, as donations decreased in the face of 
rising healthcare costs due to a worsening in health conditions.70  
 In China, the interplay of these conflicting dynamics is interesting for two 
reasons. Specifically, the historical memory of the country’s elder generation, and the 
reality presented by inadequacies of its health care system and social safety net. In the 
context of nation’s long history, China’s elderly have lived through an incredibly 
tumultuous period of time. Individuals over the age of 60 have experienced first hand 
both the horrors of widespread famine during the Great Leap Forward (dayuejin) (1958-
1961) and violent infighting brought on by Chairman Mao’s Great Proletarian Cultural 
Revolution (wuchanjieji wenhua dageming) (1966-1976). From the Second Sino-
Japanese War (kang ri zhanzheng) (1937-1945) to China’s on-again off-again Civil War 
(jiefang zhanzheng) (1927-1950) between the Nationalists (guomindang) and the 
Communists (gongchandang), individuals age 70 and older can recall growing up in the 
midst of a perpetual state of war. The legacy of violence, inflation, famine, and social 
upheaval (land reform/redistribution) will forever be etched in their memories. The China 
they know is radically different from the one younger generations have grown up in 
where GDP growth is nonstop and the quality of life is consistently improving. There is 
even a popular Chinese idiom used almost exclusively to refer to older people and it 																																																								
69 Charities Aid Foundation, CAF World Giving Index 2016, 21. 70	P. (Pamala) Wiepking and R.N. (Russell) James III, “Why Are the Oldest Old Less Generous?” 503-
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translates as “having experienced the ups and downs of life” (baojingcangsang). 
Understandably so, there seems to be a greater cultural emphasis on social or societal 
stability (shehui wending). This historical memory more or less influences the way 
people regard political, economic and social developments. In addition to their detailed 
analysis of various policy implications, Guonan Ma and Wang Yi briefly admit that part 
of the reason why the Chinese savings rate is so high is because of “historical 
experience.”71 Therefore, it is conceivable that historical experience could all together 
discourage an older individual’s willingness to donate, or at the least decrease their 
amount of donation.  
 For the longest time, development of China’s health care system seriously lagged 
behind the nation’s economic growth. In 2004, The Economist estimated that 90% of 
those living in the countryside and 60% of urban dwellers were without health insurance, 
which only fueled out-of-pocket spending.72 With the exception of the extremely well off, 
fears over the “collapse of affordable health care” contributed to higher rates of saving.73  
In the past, it would not be out of the ordinary for individuals to save 40% or more of 
their disposable income in case of needing emergency medical services, especially 
migrant workers who are usually uninsured due to China’s household registration system 
(hukou). On account of typically low salaries for doctors and abysmal wait times to 
receive medical attention, it is common practice for patients to give doctor’s small bribes 
in the form of “red packets” (hongbao). After public outcry for health care reform in 
2009, the Chinese government implemented measures that have extended public health 
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insurance to around 95% of the population.74 However, patients are still forced to pay a 
significant portion of the costs of services out-of-pocket. Since comprehensive health 
care reform has only taken place in recent years (after the Wenchuan earthquake), the 
financial burden of healthcare costs is still relevant, especially for migrant workers and 
the elderly.  
 Theoretically, only the very wealthy have the means to both spend lavishly on 
health care and donate generously to philanthropic causes. As health care spending 
increases, willingness to donate should increase along with extent of donation. At the 
same time though, because health care costs rise with age, one would expect willingness 
to donate and extent of donation to decrease. This would seemingly be exacerbated by the 
fact that Chinese people often retire early (men at age 60 and women at age 55), which 
means they are living off a fixed income via a personal pension plan or government 
disbursed social security (old-age pension, yanglaojin). Either way, as cost of living 
continually rises, it becomes more challenging to find the means to donate. It is entirely 
plausible that age might initially increase both donation willingness and amount donated, 
but I highly doubt that it will be a linear relationship. At a certain point, it most likely will 
fall. Although it is difficult to definitively predict the effect of these different factors on 
donation levels, this paper strives to clarify them. 
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Chapter 5—Gender 
 
 As touched upon briefly in the literature review, there are competing claims 
surrounding the donation tendencies of males and females. Research supports the fact 
that women tend to be more charitable than men in the sense that they “are more likely to 
give and give more” even when controlling for income.75 Mesch attributes this recent 
growth in female philanthropy to both economic and social gains made in the past thirty 
to forty years, specifically with regard to income and education.76 However, the datasets 
that this claim is predicated upon are both national sets containing data from U.S. men 
and women, making it difficult to directly apply their conclusions to gender-based 
philanthropy in China.  
 As figure 1 indicates, global donation behavior for men and women has fluctuated 
over the past five years with a higher percentage of the female population choosing to 
donate from 2011-2013 and a higher percentage of the male population donating in 2014:
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Figure 1. Global participation in donating money, by gender 
Source: Charities Aid Foundation, CAF World Giving Index 2016, Charities Aid 
Foundation (CAF): 20, 2016. <http://admin.issuelab.org/permalink/resource/25787>. 
 
Most recently though, men and women donated at comparable percentages for data 
available in the calendar year of 2015 (see figure 1 above). As previously mentioned in 
the literature review, an interesting divergence occurred between developed and 
transitioning economies. The percentage of women donating in developed economies was 
six percentage points higher than men, while the percentage of men donating in 
transitioning economies was on average one percentage point higher than women.77  
Therefore, the case becomes an interesting one for China. Although more aptly 
considered a transitioning economy, countries like the United States have lobbied for 
China to be considered a developed nation in the eyes of the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) due to its economic might. One trip to Shanghai or Beijing might leave you in 																																																								
77 Charities Aid Foundation, CAF World Giving Index 2016, 20. 
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agreement, but seeing rural China in the undeveloped countryside will certainly make 
you reconsider.  
 Although Chinese society is infamous for being historically patriarchal, China 
today has made much progress. To a certain extent though, China still happens to “regard 
men as superior to women” (zhongnan qingnü) in many facets of society, especially when 
it comes to wealth. This reality has implications for an individual’s ability to donate. 
Women have by and large been left out the country’s massive real estate boom, which 
has generated an extraordinary amount of residential real estate wealth predominantly for 
men as Chinese families choose to support men over women when it comes to assisting 
with down payments on urban homes.78 Culturally speaking, the procurement of housing 
is considered the responsibility of the man and his family. Consequently, owning a home 
often becomes the most important requirement to satisfy if a man wishes to find a woman 
to marry. No house often means that a man will remain a “bare stick” (guanggunr), or an 
“unmarried bachelor.” Many women often contribute to paying for houses they share 
with their spouse, but very rarely do they have their names on the property deeds 
denoting ownership:  
 When so many women are raised to believe that it is only fair for their parents to 
 help their brother or male cousin buy a home because they are male, the same 
 women are likely to believe that it is only fair for the boyfriend or husband to 
 have sole ownership of a home, even though the women may have heavily 
 financed the home purchase.79 
 
Citing a 2010 All-China Women’s Federation (ACWF) and National Bureau of Statistics 
(NBS) survey of over 105,000 people, Fincher claims that “only one in every fifteen 
single women owned their own home (6.9 percent), compared with one in five single men 																																																								
78 Leta Hong Fincher, Leftover Women: The Resurgence of Gender Inequality in China, (London, GB: Zed 
Books, 2014), 75. 
79 Ibid, 79. 
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(21.8 percent).”80 This phenomenon may have greater implications for donation behavior 
among women in this paper since the data is filtered through by each individual head of 
household. Conceivably, the number of female heads of households may be so few that 
gender (being female in this case) as a variable may be unable to cause significant 
variation in individual donation behavior. 
 Regardless, gender dynamics in China makes predicting the effect of gender 
(being female in this case) on donation behavior particularly difficult despite recent 
progress women have made in education and the workplace. To get a true sense of the 
significance of gender in determining charitable donations will necessitate controlling for 
a host of other variables (income, education, etc…) and potentially the use of interaction 
variables. Data concerns aside, I would expect female heads of households to be both 
more willing to donate (in line with international trends), and to donate more than their 
male counterparts.
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Chapter 6—Data and the Statistical Model 
 
 The dataset used for analysis comes from the China Household Finance Survey 
(CHFS) conducted by the Southwestern University of Finance and Economics in 
Chengdu, China. Released in 2012, the first wave of the survey had a sample size of 
8,438 households, which consisted of approximately 29,463 individuals. The breadth of 
the survey is extensive, covering nearly 29 provinces, 262 counties, and 1048 
communities. Interviews were conducted over the telephone, face-to-face, and with the 
assistance of a computer (computer assisted personal interview–CAPI). The reported 
overall refusal rate hovers around 11.6%. The sampling design employed by the CHFS is 
rather complicated, but it is comprised of two components: The first is an overall 
sampling scheme made up of a “stratified three-stage probability proportion to size (PPS) 
random sampling design.” The second is an onsite mapping scheme developed by the 
CHFS that utilizes vector maps, GPS/GIS, and remote sensing technologies to aid in the 
selection of households.81 
 Specifically, the analysis of this paper revolves around a variable for individual 
contributions (converted to monetary value) in response to the Wenchuan earthquake. In 
the interest of avoiding potentially skewed regression results, I decided to take the log of 
this variable. Additionally, I made a separate dummy variable from the original measure 																																																								
81 *Disclaimer* All information related to the dataset in this paragraph (including statistics and procedure) 
is the property of the CHFS, and comes directly from their online materials published at 
<http://www.chfsdata.org/default.aspx>. 
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of household contributions to exercise in a logistic regression. I separated the cases in this 
dataset by head of household, which effectively conducts data at the individual level (by 
head of household) so as to avoid distorting results through the overstatement of donation 
amounts. Since the purpose of this paper is to determine the individual characteristic 
trends of donators, two main questions need to be answered:  
1. Who donated? Who didn’t donate at all? (i.e. characteristics of each) 
2. Who donated more relative to others? (i.e. distinguishing 
characteristics and the extent to which they influenced donation 
amounts) 
I’ve employed a two-step regression model to help yield the most comprehensive 
explanation behind the levels of charitable giving witnessed during the immediate post-
Wenchuan earthquake period. First, a binary logistic regression to predict donation 
behavior itself; and second, a linear regression to predict the variation in donation 
amount. Essentially, the logistic regression indicates the characteristics of who donated, 
while the linear regression highlights the extent to which those characteristics influenced 
donation amounts. I’ve also incorporated a slew of dummy variables to control for a 
greater number of potentially influential independent variables (different characteristics). 
Finally, I’ve chosen to compute a number of interaction variables to help test the 
relationships between the different independent variables at particular values of each 
other as well. 
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Dependent Variables 
 
 As previously mentioned, the most important variable in this paper is the 
Wenchuan earthquake donation variable. This hails from the CAPI portion of the CHFS, 
question [A4009] that asks, “At the time of the Wenchuan earthquake how much money 
did you donate? Please convert material donations to their monetary value (unit: RMB).” 
Since the distribution of this variable was partially positively skewed, I took the log of it 
(a common practice) to make the distribution more normal and better suited for 
correlation purposes in a regression (see figure 2). 
 
Figure 2. Histogram of the dependent variable, (log_donations) 
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As figure 2 indicates, (log_donations) has a fairly uniform distribution, with a mean of 
about 3.90. With this new variable (log_donations) perfectly suited for a linear regression 
measuring extent of donation, I needed to prepare a form of the variable compatible for a 
logistic regression measuring donation decision. A logistic regression requires the nature 
of the dependent variable to binary, so I created a dummy variable (donated) from the 
newly computed (log_donations) that takes on a value of 1 for any amount of money 
donated, and a value of 0 for no donation amount.  
 
 
Figure 3. Distribution of the dependent variable, (donated) 
Even if an individual theoretically only donated 1 RMB (~0.14 U.S. cents), they would 
still assume a value of 1 with this new dummy variable. Understanding the coding of this 
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dependent variable and its distribution shown above in figure 3, far more respondents 
made the decision to donate at least some amount of money. The data from respondents 
in the sample size confirms the general perception of donations after the Wenchuan 
earthquake in China’s “year of philanthropy.” 
 
Independent Variables 
 
 The independent variables (covariates) I chose to include range from a collection 
of dummy variables (a variable that can only take the value of 1 or 0) to a number of 
interaction variables. There are 17 of them total. 1-4) Tier 1 Cities: (province) is a 
residency variable that the CHFS provides, but there are four Tier 1 cities that act as 
“county-level administrative units” (shixiaqu) (run directly by the central government) 
listed as responses in the variable’s frequency distribution. I made separate dummy 
variables for each of the four cities (shanghai, beijing, tianjin, chongqing) that are coded 
as 1 for residence in each respective Tier 1 city, and 0 for all other non-corresponding 
answers. 5) Female: (female) is a dummy gender variable that is coded 1 for female and 0 
for male. 6) Rural: (rural) is a dummy variable coded 1 for residence in the rural 
countryside and 0 for residence in a non-rural area. 7) Age: (age_2012) is a variable I 
computed by subtracting the CHFS variable [A2005] for “date of birth” in year from the 
year the survey was conducted (2012). 8) Age Squared: (age_2012_squared) is the 
computed (age_2012) variable squared for quadratic purposes in the two regression 
equations. 9) Education: (educ_ordinal) is a recoded version of the CHFS variable for 
education level [A2012], which ranges from a value of 1 “never attended school” to the 
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value of 8 “masters degree” with various increasing sublevels in between for “primary 
school,” “junior high,” “high school,” “secondary/vocational school,” 
“college/vocational,” and “undergraduate degree.” 10) Health Care Spending: 
(log_healthcare_spend) is a variable I computed by taking the log of the CHFS variable 
[G1018] for money spent on health care the prior year in RMB. 11) Income: 
(log_hh_income) is another variable I computed by taking the log of the CHFS variable 
for household income. 12) Political Affiliation: (comm) is a dummy variable computed 
for the response “Chinese Communist Party” to the CHFS question [A2015] that asks, 
“You are of what political affiliation?” (comm) takes on the value of 1 for CCP affiliation 
and 0 for non-CCP affiliations. 13) Government Job: (gov_dept) is a dummy variable 
computed for the response “Government Department” to the CHFS question [A3014] that 
asks, “What type of work unit is this?”  
 Covariates 14-17 are four separate gender interaction variables that were 
computed by multiplying the (female) variable by various other independent variables to 
see the effect of the two variables (at different values of each other) produced on 
(log_donations) and (donated). For example, female heads of households with higher 
household incomes, or female heads of households with higher degrees of education, and 
so on. The complicated nature of gender and charitable donations necessitates examining 
the possibilities of donation tendency variation at these different levels. 14-17) Gender 
Interaction Variables: (rural_female) was obtained by multiplying (female) and (rural); 
(comm_female) was obtained by multiplying (comm) and (female); (female_income) was 
computed by multiplying (female) and (log_hh_income); and finally, (female_educ) was 
computed by multiplying  (female) and (educ_ordinal). Although the likelihood of these 
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four interaction variables causing significant variation in either of the two charitable 
donations variables is relatively low, they may divulge interesting instances of correlation 
in the data.  
Table 1 Descriptive Statistics 
  
 N Min Max Median Mean Std. 
Deviation 
% 
Missing 
log_donations 8135 .00 13.24 4.615 3.906 2.387 72.3 
donated 8134 0 1 1 .798 .401 72.3 
shanghai 29324 0 1 0 .05 .219 0 
beijing 29324 0 1 0 .034 .181 0 
tianjin 29324 0 1 0 .018 .135 0 
chongqing 29324 0 1 0 .021 .146 0 
female 29324 0 1 0 .492 .499 0 
rural 8438 0 1 0 .38 .486 71.2 
age_2012 29322 1 112 39 39.262 20.674 0 
age_2012_squared 29322 1 12544 1521 1968.947 1747.69 0 
educ_ordinal 24448 1 8 3 3.415 1.695 16.6 
log_hh_income 8381 .00 14.91 10.24 9.767 2.267 71.4 
log_healthcare_spend 3665 .60 5.26 3.259 3.135 .613 87.5 
comm 15317 0 1 0 .13 .336 47.8 
gov_dept 4404 0 1 0 .082 .275 85 
rural_female 8438 0 1 0 .147 .355 71.2 
comm_female 15317 0 1 0 .035 .185 47.8 
female_income 8381 .00 14.91 0 4.499 5.101 71.4 
female_educ 24448 0 8 1 1.617 2.025 16.6 
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According to Table 1 on the previous page, a few variables have rather high numbers 
listed under the ‘percent missing’ column. Unfortunate as it is, the high percentages are 
not necessarily unusual or unexpected, especially given the sensitive nature of some of 
the questions respondents were asked.  
 
Binary Logistic Regression 
 
 The logistic regression equation used to analyze willingness to donate (i.e. who 
did/did not donate) and its regression results are provided on the next page: 
Logged odds (donated) = β0 + β1 shanghai + β2 beijing + β3 tianjin + β4 chongqing + β5 
female + β6 rural + β7 age_2012 +β8 age_2012_squared + β9 educ_ordinal + β10 
log_hh_income + β11 log_healthcare_spend + β12 comm + β13 gov_dept + β14 
rural_female + β15 comm_female + β16 female_income + β17 female_educ  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
*For the remaining portion of the regression table, please turn the page* 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
N -2 Log 
likelihood 
Cox & Snell R 
Square 
Nagelkerke R 
Square 
1132 423.873 .068 .189 
 45 
Table 2 Binary Logistic Regression Results 
 
*: p<0.1; **: p<0.05; ***: p<0.01 
 
Inserting the coefficient estimates, the updated version of the logistic regression equation 
is as follows: 
Logged odds (donated) = (-4.203) + (.172) shanghai + (-.532) beijing + (17.463) tianjin 
+ (18.816) chongqing + (-.617) female + (-.778) rural + (.233) age_2012 + (-.003) 
age_2012_squared + (.376) educ_ordinal + (-.098) log_hh_income + (.665) 
log_healthcare_spend + (.848) comm + (1.280) gov_dept + (.877) rural_female + (-.341) 
comm_female + (.035) female_income + (-.075) female_educ 
 
 
 
Independent 
Variables 
Coefficient 
Estimate 
Standard Error 
(S.E.) 
Exp(B) 
Constant -4.203 2.565 - - 
shanghai .172 .446 1.187 
beijing -.532 .471 .588 
tianjin 17.463 7444.924 38362180.6 
chongqing 18.816 13948.230 148498362 
female -.617 2.757 .540 
rural -.778* .413 .459 
age_2012 .233*** .072 1.263 
age_2012_squared -.003*** .001 .997 
educ_ordinal .376** .157 1.457 
log_hh_income -.098 .200 .906 
log_healthcare_spend .665** .260 1.944 
comm .848 .688 2.336 
gov_dept 1.280 1.033 3.595 
rural_female .877 .720 2.403 
comm_female -.341 1.039 .711 
female_income .035 .268 1.036 
female_educ -.075 .196 .928 
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Interpretation of Binary Logistic Regression Results 
 
 At first glance, the results of the logistic regression yield that only five variables 
are statistically significant at any level: the two age variables at the 1 percent level, 
education and health care at the 5 percent level, and rural at the 10 percent level. A one-
unit increase in level of education increases the logged odds of donation by .376, or 45.7 
percent using the “Exp(B)” value.  Increasing the health care spending variable by one-
unit ends up increasing the odds of donation by .665, almost 95 percent. On the other 
hand though, living in a rural area results in a decrease in donation odds by about 54.1 
percent.  
 The two age related variables are interesting. Since age_2012 has a positive 
coefficient (.233) and age_2012_squared has a negative one (-.003), they form a 
downward (concave down) facing quadratic curve indicating that the initial positive 
effect of age on donation odds peaks at a certain point and then decreases. In the 
traditional form of a quadratic equation (y = ax2+ bx +c), age_2012 can be thought of as 
the ‘x-term’ and age_2012_squared as the ‘x2-term.’ The quadratic solution (–b/2a) will 
grant the peak age, which in this case is 38.83 years old. So, until the age of about 39 
years old, each additional year of age increases the logged odds of donation by 26.3 
percent. After the age of 39, the strength of the relationship decreases. Overall, the 
combination of all 17 of these covariates provides a relatively incomplete explanation of 
willingness to donate as shown by the low Cox-Snell (.068) and Nagelkerke (.189) ‘R 
Square’ values. However, given the rather inclusive nature of the dependent variable 
donated where giving even 1 RMB is considered a charitable contribution, it is hard to 
 47 
narrow down specific characteristics as standing out in the decision to donate. So to a 
certain extent, the logistic regression results are as expected.  
 
Linear Regression 
 
 The linear regression equation developed to analyze variation in extent of 
donation is included below: 
(log_donations) = β0 + β1 shanghai + β2 beijing + β3 tianjin + β4 chongqing + β5 female + 
β6 rural + β7 age_2012 +β8 age_2012_squared + β9 educ_ordinal + β10 log_hh_income + 
β11 log_healthcare_spend + β12 comm + β13 gov_dept + β14 rural_female + β15 
comm_female + β16 female_income + β17 female_educ 
 
 
 
*For the remaining portion of the regression table, please turn the page* 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
N Ra R Square Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
1131 .610 .372 .363 1.54 
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Table 3 Linear Regression Results  
 
*: p<0.1; **: p<0.05; ***: p<0.01 
With the coefficient estimates, the linear regression equation reads: 
(log_donations) = (-4.316) + (.221) shanghai + (-.518) beijing + (-.063) tianjin + (.389) 
chongqing + (.146) female + (-.616) rural + (.170) age_2012 + (-.002) 
age_2012_squared + (.323) educ_ordinal + (.181) log_hh_income + (.687) 
log_healthcare_spend + (.747) comm + (.479) gov_dept + (.720) rural_female + (-.308) 
comm_female + (-.032) female_income + (.042) female_educ 
 
 
 
Independent 
Variables 
Coefficient 
Estimate 
Standard Error 
(S.E.) 
t-ratio 
Constant -4.316*** .866 -4.981 
shanghai .221 .153 1.440 
beijing -.518*** .159 -3.254 
tianjin -.063 .306 -.206 
chongqing .389 .559 .697 
female .146 .866 .168 
rural -.616*** .167 -3.691 
age_2012 .170*** .033 5.193 
age_2012_squared -.002*** .000 -4.699 
educ_ordinal .323*** .044 7.361 
log_hh_income .181*** .058 3.123 
log_healthcare_spend .687*** .094 7.293 
comm .747*** .152 4.925 
gov_dept .479*** .155 3.079 
rural_female .720** .288 2.503 
comm_female -.308 .236 -1.309 
female_income -.032 .081 -.396 
female_educ .042 .059 .707 
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Interpretation of Linear Regression Results 
 
 The linear regression results are much improved in comparison to the results from 
the logistic regression. Excluding the constant, ten covariates are statistically significant: 
nine of them at the 1 percent level, and one at the 5 percent level. As in the logistic 
regression, education and health care spending retain positive relationships, while rural 
residency continues to have a negative relationship. So education and health care 
spending increase donation amounts, but rural residency decreases an individual’s 
donation amount. Increasing the head of household’s family income by one-unit results in 
a .181-unit increase in their extent of donation. This time, both CCP affiliation and 
having a government job are positively correlated with the amount of donation.  
 The age related variables exhibit the same behavior as in the logistic regression 
results where the relationship peaks then decreases in strength. However, instead of 
around the age of 39 like the previous time, the relationship between age and extent of 
donation peaks at about 43 years old. Until the age of 43, an incremental one-year 
increase in age will lead to a steady .170-unit increase in RMB donated (logged). The two 
most interesting results by far are for the variables beijing and rural_female. Beijing 
residents appear to be inherently less generous, since living in the Tier 1 city of Beijing 
means an individual’s charitable donations suffer a .518-unit decrease. Interesting enough 
though, being a female living in a rural area is associated with a .720-unit increase in 
charitable donations. Although imperfect, this linear regression model is much stronger 
than the logistic regression one. According to the ‘Adjusted R Square’ value, 36.3 percent 
 50 
of variation in donations made in response to the Wenchuan earthquake can be explained 
by these 17 covariates. 
Chapter 7—Conclusion 
  
 Before revisiting causal claims made in the four main causal mechanism chapters, 
it is important to note that correlation does not necessarily mean causation. The 
regression results can suggest that there might be some truth to the causal mechanism 
claims, but at the same time they must be viewed in the context of the model’s 
limitations. Nevertheless, the two-part regression model yielded an array of interesting 
coefficient estimates. Between both sets of regressions, only rural residency, age, 
education level, and healthcare spending were statistically significant. As a result, only 
these four influencing factors affected the variation in both willingness to donate and 
extent of donation. Of the four, age is the most intriguing. With peak age for both 
willingness to contribute and extent of contribution reached at about 39 and 43 years old 
respectively, this suggests that older Chinese individuals are significantly less generous 
than the elderly in other countries. As prior research (Wiepking and James III) found, 
only the “oldest of old” saw this reversal in trend.82 Chinese individuals see it happen at a 
much younger age according to the regression results in this paper. Although it is difficult 
to speculate as to why, one legitimate possibility would be the onset of elder care 
expenses for both the individual’s parents and their spouse’s parents. If the respondent is 
																																																								
82 P. (Pamala) Wiepking and R.N. (Russell) James III, “Why Are the Oldest Old Less Generous?” 503-504.  	
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of age 40, it is more than likely that their parents are of the typical age of those needing 
such support. 
 Next, for the two most fascinating regression result revelations: Beijing residency 
and rural-female heads of households. Both variables were statistically insignificant as 
covariates in the logistic regression equation, which means that neither could help explain 
variation in donation decision (willingness). However, they help account for variation in 
donation extent. Essentially, the Beijing residency coefficient estimate indicates that 
residency in the specific Tier 1 city seriously decreased the amount an individual chose to 
donate. As a key political center with a substantial number of wealthy elite, it is hard to 
imagine a narrative to support this particular result. If anything though, it confirms Bruce 
Dickson’s prior findings with donations from Chinese entrepreneurs. Specifically, the 
fact that less charitable giving was associated with more affluent and well-developed 
areas.83 It is also quite possible that the sheer diversity of respondents with residency in 
Beijing can be blamed. In other words, it might just be that a coincidental 
overrepresentation of respondents with non-controlled for characteristics caused the 
variation in the dependent variable. It is impossible to say for sure. Similar to the Beijing 
residency variable, it is difficult to come up with a legitimate explanation behind the fact 
that being a female head of household living in the countryside actually increased one’s 
extent of donation. Common sense would dictate otherwise, especially when considering 
means or capability to donate. It may also just be a coincidence. 
 In my opinion, the most telling regression result of this paper is the effect of 
political status (CCP affiliation and/or government job) on donation extent. Given the 
Chinese government’s recent “hands-on” role in cultivating its preferred civil society, it 																																																								
83 Bruce J. Dickson, Red Capitalists in China, 120. 
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is unsurprising that the findings from the data model suggest the relative importance of 
political status in determining the amount an individual contributes. To a certain degree, 
this grants credence to the effectiveness of the CCP’s propagandizing of models. Yes, it 
is no exaggeration to say that the Party successfully mobilized its members (and spurred 
donations) with a pervasive sense of  social responsibility in the aftermath of the 
Wenchuan earthquake. China’s model of “state-led civil society” will likely remain for 
the long-term, and continue to serve the state in whatever social welfare capacity deemed 
essential. More importantly though, the earthquake awakened a dormant sense of social 
consciousness in China. Whether that social consciousness arose solely as part of a 
growing wave of individualism or due to the efforts of the Communist Party, it’s hard to 
definitively say. In all actuality, it’s probably a mixture of both. Regardless, the Great 
Wenchuan Earthquake changed the dynamics of civil society and the individual in China. 
The New Yorker’s own Evan Osnos put it best when he wrote: 
 For all of the devastation in 2008, the legacy of that earthquake was only partly 
 physical. It changed the way many Chinese people talked about government 
 accountability, charity, and citizenship.84 
 
I would even add that it changed the way the CCP approached civil society. The 
Communist Party benefited from the individual (and individual donations) in this case, 
which only reinforced the idea that granting the illusion of autonomy for civil society 
actors can be effective. In such a way, the Party was able to capitalize on the moment and 
unify the country. During recovery and reconstruction efforts, Party media often made 
use of the Chinese idiom, “much hardship/disaster regenerates a nation” 
(duonanxingbang). Similarly, the nation’s civil society regenerated as well.  																																																								
84 Evan Osnos, “The Sichuan Earthquake Test,” The New Yorker, April 20, 2013, 
<http://www.newyorker.com/news/evan-osnos/the-sichuan-earthquake-test>. 	
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